Fordham Law Review
Volume 89

Issue 6

Article 17

2021

The Sunset of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of
2016 and the Rise of the Demand and Refusal Rule
Fallon S. Sheridan
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fallon S. Sheridan, The Sunset of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 and the Rise of the
Demand and Refusal Rule, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 2841 ().
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss6/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE SUNSET OF THE HOLOCAUST
EXPROPRIATED ART RECOVERY ACT OF 2016
AND THE RISE OF THE DEMAND AND REFUSAL
RULE
Fallon S. Sheridan*
During World War II, hundreds of thousands of works of art were
confiscated by Nazis under the direction of Adolf Hitler or sold for less than
market value by members of the Jewish community fleeing Nazi Germany.
Shockingly, an estimated 100,000 of the 600,000 works that were taken are
still missing today. In recognition of the need for laws that adequately assist
original owners (and their heirs) in recovering these works of art, the U.S.
Congress passed the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (“the
HEAR Act”). The HEAR Act supplanted state statutes of limitations for Naziconfiscated artwork with a national six-year statute of limitations. A cause
of action for replevin of Nazi-confiscated artwork under the HEAR Act
accrues once the original owner has “actual knowledge” of a claim against
the current possessor. The HEAR Act contains a sunset provision—causing
it to expire on January 1, 2027. Upon expiration, the law applied to cases of
Nazi-confiscated art recovery will revert to state statutes. This Note
examines two state accrual rules for causes of action for replevin of personal
property—the discovery rule and the demand and refusal rule—and proceeds
to examine their strengths and weaknesses. This Note suggests that the
HEAR Act should be used as a model for states to address the need for
claimant-friendly accrual rules for causes of action for replevin. Ultimately,
this Note argues that upon expiration of the HEAR Act: (1) states, rather
than the federal government, should adopt the demand and refusal rule; (2)
the rule should be applied to all types of stolen chattels, not just Naziconfiscated art; (3) demand and refusal should be applied to thieves and badfaith purchasers, not just good-faith purchasers; (4) the rule should not be
applied retroactively to avoid constitutionality concerns; and (5) the
duration of the statute of limitations should be shortened.

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2019, Yale University. I
would like to thank Professor James Kainen for his invaluable expertise and guidance, my
family and friends for their love and support, and the Fordham Law Review editors and staff
for their assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental question posed by the HEAR Act is, have we here in the
United States done enough to ensure fair and equitable solutions? I believe
we have done a great deal, but we still could and should do much more.
—Ronald S. Lauder1

During the 1930s and amidst World War II, Adolf Hitler’s National
Socialist German Workers’ Party undertook what was later coined “the
greatest art theft in history.”2 Hitler’s regime ultimately took an estimated
600,000 works of art, and the United States has undertaken a number of
efforts since World War II to repatriate this stolen art.3 These efforts
culminated in the passage of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
of 20164 (“the HEAR Act”), which supplanted state statutes of limitations
and replaced them with a national six-year statute of limitations for “artwork
or other property that was lost during the covered period” of January 1, 1933
to December 31, 1945 “because of Nazi persecution.”5
Absent the HEAR Act, a cause of action for replevin of a Nazi-confiscated
work of art would fall under a state’s statute of limitations; the majority of
state jurisdictions, such as New Jersey, employ the discovery rule,6 while
New York employs a minority demand and refusal rule.7 Scholars and courts
disagree over which of these rules better protects stolen artwork.8 Upon the
HEAR Act’s expiration on January 1, 2027, states will decide whether the
discovery rule or the demand and refusal rule is the better method to continue
to protect and repatriate stolen works of art.9

1. The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their Lost
Heritage: Hearing on S. 2763 Before the Subcomms. On the Const., Oversight, Agency
Action, Fed. Rts. & Fed. Cts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2016)
[hereinafter HEAR Act Hearing] (statement of Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman of
the Council, World Jewish Restitution Organization).
2. Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, Note, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016:
An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369 (quoting
Alex Shoumatoff, The Devil and the Art Dealer, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/04/degenerate-art-cornelius-gurlitt-munichapartment [https://perma.cc/C8E8-TZVN]); see also Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery
Act of 2016 § 2(1), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note (calling this time period the “greatest displacement
of art in human history”).
3. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Opinion, Art Stolen by the Nazis Is Still Missing. Here’s How We
Can Recover It., WASH. POST. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/noone-should-trade-in-or-possess-art-stolen-by-the-nazis/2019/01/02/01990232-0ed3-11e9831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html [https://perma.cc/97N5-KBKF]. For a discussion of efforts
by the United States to repatriate Nazi-confiscated art, see infra notes 27–29 and
accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note).
5. Id. § 5(a), 130 Stat. at 1526.
6. See generally O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
7. See generally Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y.
1991).
8. See infra Parts I.D–E.
9. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(g).
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This Note argues that the expiration of the HEAR Act should be the
impetus for placing the issue of discovery versus demand and refusal on
states’ agendas. This Note further argues that the HEAR Act’s sympathy for
claimants and emphasis on owner protection should be used as a model to
apply the demand and refusal rule to all cases of stolen chattels.
Part I discusses the circumstances and historical context behind Naziconfiscated art and its present implications. Part I also introduces the
purposes ascribed to causes of action for replevin and statutes of limitations.
From there, Part I discusses three rules for accrual of a cause of action for
replevin: (1) accrual at the time of the theft, (2) the discovery rule, and (3)
the demand and refusal rule. Part I then provides a general overview of the
HEAR Act. Part II discusses arguments advanced by scholars and judges for
and against the two more modern accrual rules: the discovery rule and the
demand and refusal rule.
Part III argues that upon expiration of the HEAR Act, states should
reevaluate their statutes of limitations for causes of action for replevin of
stolen chattels. This Note suggests state legislatures adopt the demand and
refusal rule and provides a number of considerations for that future
legislation: (1) state rather than federal implementation of the demand and
refusal rule; (2) application of the demand and refusal rule to all stolen
chattels, not just Nazi-confiscated art; (3) application of demand and refusal
to thieves and bad-faith purchasers; (4) nonretroactivity of newly
implemented demand and refusal rules; and (5) a shortening of the durations
of statutes of limitations for causes of action for replevin upon implementing
demand and refusal.
I. NAZI-CONFISCATED ART AND THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
Part I.A discusses the historical context of Nazi-confiscated art to provide
the basis for understanding the HEAR Act. Part I.B explains causes of action
for replevin and the purposes underlying statutes of limitations generally.
Parts I.C–E explain three accrual rules for statutes of limitations for causes
of action for replevin: accrual from the time of the theft; the discovery rule;
and the demand and refusal rule. The latter two of these rules are the focus
of this Note.10 Part I.F details the structure and contents of the HEAR Act,
as well as the applicability of the doctrine of laches to cases under the HEAR
Act.
10. Although outside the scope of this Note, some states, such as California, have
variations on these rules. See Tarquin Preziosi, Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art Stolen
in the Past, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 225, 247–48 (1997). Preziosi identifies other laudable
suggestions besides these accrual rules: “Legislation that requires victims of art theft to
register their stolen works and/or that requires purchasers to do a title search in order to
preserve their rights is desirable.” Id. at 252. However, J. Christian Kennedy has stated that
the U.S. government “does not have any leverage to force compliance” with registration and
museum disclosure programs. J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S.
Dep’t of State, The Role of the United States Government in Art Restitution (Apr. 23, 2007),
https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/83392.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4RA-K9FS].
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A. The Greatest Art Theft in History
Under Hitler’s oppression, Jewish property, including art, was often seized
by Nazis or sold for less than market value by members of the Jewish
community forced to flee Nazi Germany.11 Hitler’s anti-art agenda was in
large part motivated by his obsession with cultural cleansing—a cleansing he
felt could be accomplished by “merciless war” against “cultural
disintegration.”12 Inspired by Max Nordau’s Entartung (Degeneration),13
Hitler called for the eradication of all nonrepresentational art.14 Hitler’s
“degenerate artists” cleanse extended to painters, such as Vincent van Gogh,
Paul Cézanne, and Henri Matisse; filmmakers, such as Fritz Lang and Billy
Wilder; and writers, such as Franz Kafka, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, and
Bertolt Brecht.15
Under Hitler’s direction, “degenerate art” exhibitions were held to “reveal
the philosophical, political, racial and moral goals and intentions behind this
movement, and the driving forces of corruption which follow them.”16 For
example, minister of public enlightenment and propaganda, Joseph
Goebbels, established an art confiscation commission in 1937.17 The
confiscated art was collected and displayed at the “Degenerate Art Show” in
Munich.18 A pamphlet created for the art show and circulated by the Ministry
of Science, Education, and Culture stated: “Dadaism, Futurism, Cubism, and
the other isms are the poisonous flower of a Jewish parasitical plant, grown
on German soil. . . . Examples of these will be the strongest proof for the
necessity of a radical solution to the Jewish question.”19
11. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2019);
Alex Shoumatoff, The Devil and the Art Dealer, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/04/degenerate-art-cornelius-gurlitt-munichapartment [https://perma.cc/C8E8-TZVN].
For example, Jewish art dealer, Alfred
Flechtheim, who owned multiple modern art galleries, “fled to Paris and then London, leaving
behind his collection of art. He died impoverished in 1937. His family has been trying to
reclaim the collection, including The Lion Tamer for years.” Shoumatoff, supra. Cornelius
Gurlitt, who sold Max Beckmann’s The Lion Tamer to the Lempertz Auction House in 2011
for $1.17 million, entered into a settlement agreement with the Flechtheim estate, in which
“Gurlitt acknowledged that the Beckmann had been sold under duress by Flechtheim in 1934
to his father, Hildebrand Gurlitt.” Id.
12. Shoumatoff, supra note 11.
13. MAX SIMON NORDAU, DEGENERATION (trans., London, William Heinemann 1898).
Nordau’s Entartung “postulated that some of the new art and literature that was appearing in
fin de siècle Europe was the product of diseased minds.” Shoumatoff, supra note 11.
Ironically, while Hitler’s anti-Semitic agenda was inspired by Nordau’s writing, Nordau
himself viewed anti-Semitic sentiments as “alarming . . . a point that seems to have been lost
on Hitler.” Id.
14. Id. Nonrepresentational art can summarily be defined as “anything that deviate[s]
from classic representationalism . . . [e.g.,] new Expressionism, Cubism, Dadaism, Fauvism,
futurism . . . objective realism . . . Impressionism” and abstractism. Id.
15. Id.
16. Lucy Burns, Degenerate Art: Why Hitler Hated Modernism, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24819441 [https://perma.cc/W6G3-HEZ5]; see
also Shoumatoff, supra note 11.
17. Shoumatoff, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Id. (alteration in original).
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While there is a need to return these Nazi-confiscated works of art back to
their original owners (or their heirs),20 an estimated 100,000 works of art—
that is, approximately one-sixth of the works stolen—have yet to be
recovered.21 Problems associated with Nazi-confiscated art restitution
include: that many heirs of deceased owners are unaware, or have no means
of tracking, what works have been lost,22 and some countries, such as
Germany, have “no law preventing an individual or an institution from
owning looted art.”23 A lost art website established by the German
government only displayed 458 works as of 201424—a bare-bones
representation of the 100,000 works that are still missing. Most shockingly,
as of 2014, the German law permitting the Nazi’s confiscation of
“Degenerate Art” had yet to be repealed.25 Lastly, the cost of litigation for
art restitution can be very high.26
The U.S. government has undertaken a number of efforts to address Naziconfiscated art. These efforts have included convening The Washington
Conference on Holocaust Era Assets in 1998 and creating the Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Art;27 enacting the Holocaust Victims Redress Act;28 and
participating in the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference in 2009, which

20. See id.
21. Eizenstat, supra note 3.
22. Contra Preziosi, supra note 10, at 250 n.206. “The problems of proving ownership to
art lost during and before World War II are not necessarily as daunting as they seem; the Nazis
often left accurate records of what they took and where it was taken from.” Id.
23. Shoumatoff, supra note 11.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See Emily J. Henson, Comment, The Last Prisoners of War: Returning World War II
Art to Its Rightful Owners—Can Moral Obligations Be Translated into Legal Duties?, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 1147 (2002).
27. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(3), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note.
The Washington Conference established eleven nonbinding principles, to be recognized by
participating countries. Off. of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State,
Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (Dec. 3, 1998),
https://www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-nazi-confiscated-art/
[https://perma.cc/D5F8-7TGH]. These principles are: (1) identifying Nazi-confiscated
artwork; (2) making records and archives available to researchers; (3) making identification
resources available; (4) recognizing that provenances of Nazi-confiscated artwork are not
easily discoverable; (5) promoting publication of identified Nazi-confiscated art; (6) creating
a central registry of Nazi-confiscated art; (7) encouraging original owners to make claims for
their artwork; (8) creating “just and fair solution[s]” for identified, original owners and heirs
of Nazi-confiscated artwork, using fact-specific considerations; (9) taking “steps . . .
expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution” for unidentified, original owners and heirs;
(10) creating commissions to identify Nazi-confiscated art and “address[] ownership issues”;
and (11) creating and implementing procedures in participating countries to effectuate these
principles, especially alternative dispute resolution procedures. See id.
28. Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998). The Holocaust Victims Redress Act
addresses Nazi-confiscated art by stating: “It is the sense of Congress that . . . governments
should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of . . . works of art[] to the rightful
owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period of Nazi
rule . . . .” Id. § 202, 112 Stat. at 16–17. The Holocaust Victims Redress Act is highlighted in
the HEAR Act. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(4).
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issued the Terezin Declaration.29 Nonetheless, lawsuits commenced by
victims of Nazi art confiscation “face significant procedural obstacles partly
due to State statutes of limitations, which typically bar claims within some
limited number of years from either the date of the loss or the date that the
claim should have been discovered.”30 Furthermore, in Von Saher v. Norton
Simon Museum of Art31 (Von Saher I), the Ninth Circuit held that state
exceptions to statutes of limitations for Nazi-confiscated art are
unconstitutional as violative of the federal foreign affairs power. Congress
seemed to underwrite that decision by positively citing Von Saher I in the
HEAR Act.32 Specifically, Congress stated that “[i]n light of [Von Saher I],
the enactment of a Federal law is necessary to ensure that claims to Naziconfiscated art are adjudicated in accordance with United States policy.”33
B. Restitution and Restrictions: Causes of Action for Replevin and the
Purposes of Statutes of Limitations
When a chattel,34 such as a work of art, has been stolen and resold to a
good-faith purchaser, the original owner has a cause of action for replevin.35
Replevin is a “lawsuit to repossess personal property wrongfully taken or
detained by the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds
the property until the court decides who owns it.”36
Rules regarding replevin, including those rules regarding statutes of
limitations,37 differ by jurisdiction.38 Therefore, decisions about the length
of the statute of limitations and when it starts to run are up to states.
Statutes of limitations serve the purpose of ensuring that claims are
brought in a timely fashion, so that meritorious claims can be evaluated based

29. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(5). The Terezin
Declaration urged participating countries to make “[e]very effort . . . to rectify the
consequences of wrongful property seizures, such as confiscations, forced sales and sales
under duress of property, which were part of the persecution of these innocent people and
groups, the vast majority of whom died heirless.” Eren Waitzman, Terezin Declaration: The
Restitution of Property, U.K. PARLIAMENT: HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY (July 20, 2020),
https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/terezin-declaration-the-restitution-of-property
[https://perma.cc/HRE3-G5AL].
30. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(6) (“In some cases, this means
that the claims expired before World War II even ended.”).
31. 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
32. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(7). But see infra Part II.C.
33. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(7).
34. See Chattel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “chattel” as
“[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; esp., a physical object capable of
manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property”).
35. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
36. Replevin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
37. See Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
“statute of limitations” as “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute
establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued”).
38. See Replevin, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/replevin [https://perma.cc/GP52-27VA] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (“Rules on replevin
actions vary by jurisdiction.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 64)).
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on reliable evidence.39 While in the case of stolen valuable artwork it may
seem unfair to statutorily bar an original owner from making a claim for
return of an item, statutes of limitations also serve to discourage negligent,
and even calculated, delay by plaintiffs bringing causes of action.40
Although some meritorious claims will inevitably be time-barred, states
impose these procedural bars on recovery out of fairness to defendants and
on the assumption that claimants with meritorious claims “will not delay in
asserting them.”41
One difficulty in applying statutes of limitations is determining at what
point a cause of action “accrues,” or the statute begins to run.42 The accrual
rules applied by states are not uniform, and they are often left to courts to
establish because they are not addressed in state statutes; even when they are
addressed by statute, they are often left vague.43 While a cause of action for
replevin of stolen art originally accrued “at the time of the wrongful
taking,”44 courts relied on equitable doctrines to alter the time of accrual in
cases of stolen art.45 These equitable considerations led to the discovery
rule46 and the demand and refusal rule.47
C. The Original Rule: Accrual from the Time of Theft
The original rule for the accrual of a cause of action for replevin provided
that “the cause of action for the recovery of stolen art [or any other chattel]
traditionally accrued at the time of the wrongful taking.”48 This original rule
was a direct result of the vagueness with which state legislatures described
“accrual” in their statutes of limitations.49 Most state legislatures only
39. See Statute of Limitations, supra note 37 (“Statutes of limitations, like the equitable
doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” (quoting Ord. of R.R. Tels.
v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944))).
40. See Leah E. Eisen, Commentary, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes
of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1072
(1991).
41. See id. at 1072–73.
42. See id. at 1073.
43. See id. at 1073–75.
44. Id. at 1074.
45. Id. at 1074–75. “[D]ue to the growing recognition of the difficulty of discovering who
possesses stolen property and the ease with which individuals can hide property,” these other
doctrines emerged. Id. For a discussion of why the doctrine of adverse possession is
inconducive to cases of stolen art, see id. at 1075–78 (citing O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d
862 (N.J. 1980)).
46. See infra Part I.D.
47. See infra Part I.E.
48. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1074; see also Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-1033,
2007 WL 1016996, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007) (holding that a woman’s claim for a van
Gogh painting, sold under Nazi persecution, accrued in 1938 when the painting was sold and
thus the statute ran while World War II was still going on).
49. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1073 (“While state legislatures typically designate the
length of a limitations period, they tend to leave the responsibility for determining when the
accrual period begins to the courts.”).
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provide that the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
accrues but do not define accrual.50 Courts thus originally premised accrual
on the idea that “the cause of action accrues upon the commission of the
tortious act”—which, for a cause of action for replevin, would be the time of
the theft.51 From there, the thief would be said to be in “adverse possession”
of the chattel—such that upon the running of the statute, the thief would
acquire good title.52
This original accrual rule gradually changed as courts began to recognize
the difficulty of identifying the possessor of a stolen chattel and the “ease
with which” movable chattels can be hidden.53 Thus, courts developed
judicial doctrines to defer the accrual of a cause of action for replevin of a
stolen chattel past the date of the theft and to some other date in the future.54
The two modern accrual rules relevant to this Note are the discovery rule55
and the demand and refusal rule.56
D. Modern Adaptations: The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule provides that “in an appropriate case, a cause of action
[for replevin] will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or by exercise
of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which
form the basis of a cause of action.”57 Courts have adopted the discovery
rule “[t]o avoid harsh results from the mechanical application of the
statute.”58 In applying the discovery rule to a cause of action for replevin of
artwork, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that renowned artist Georgia
O’Keeffe’s statute of limitations for replevin of allegedly stolen paintings
began to run only when she knew or should have known “of the cause of

50. See id. at 1073 n.32.
51. Id. at 1074.
52. See Adverse Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The doctrine
by which title to real property is acquired as a result of such use or enjoyment over a specified
period of time.”); see also O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980) (“The
acquisition of title to real and personal property by adverse possession is based on the
expiration of a statute of limitations. . . . To establish title by adverse possession to chattels,
the rule of law has been that the possession must be hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and
continuous.” (citations omitted)). For a more thorough discussion of adverse possession, see
Henson, supra note 26, at 1136–37.
53. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1074–78 (describing that the moveable nature of chattels
supports a change in the accrual rules for stolen chattels, stating: “one can readily move and
easily conceal art objects”). Compare, for example, a cause of action for the eviction of an
adverse possessor of real property, which is not moveable: “The considerations are different
with real estate . . . . Real estate is fixed and cannot be moved or concealed. The owner of
real property knows or should know where his property is located and reasonably can be
expected to be aware of . . . [adverse] possession on it.” O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873. For a
further discussion of the mobility of artwork, see Henson, supra note 26, at 1148.
54. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1075.
55. See infra Part I.D.
56. See infra Part I.E.
57. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869 (citing Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 386 A.2d 1310, 1311 (N.J.
1978)).
58. Id.
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action, including the identity of the possessor of the paintings.”59 The
discovery rule, in calling for the accrual of an action for replevin upon actual
or constructive discovery, emphasizes due diligence.60
In O’Keeffe v. Snyder,61 the Supreme Court of New Jersey employed the
discovery rule. O’Keeffe sought to replevy three of her paintings that turned
up in Barry Snyder’s possession, who at the time was doing business as the
Princeton Gallery of Fine Art.62 O’Keeffe filed her complaint in 1976 and
alleged that the paintings had gone missing from An American Place Art
Gallery in 1946.63 Factually significant to the court’s use of the discovery
rule was that O’Keeffe, upon noticing her paintings were missing from the
gallery, told no one and did not report the missing paintings to the proper
authorities.64 Furthermore, the paintings were uninsured; O’Keeffe sought
no reimbursement for the paintings; O’Keeffe did not publish the missing
paintings; and in mentioning the missing paintings to the director of The Art
Institute of Chicago, she took no measures to ask him to help locate the
paintings.65
It was not until 1972, about twenty-six years after the paintings went
missing, that O’Keeffe allowed the paintings’ loss to be reported to the Art
Dealers Association of America.66 In 1975, O’Keeffe discovered the
paintings were in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York, and in 1976, she
discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had sold the paintings to Snyder.67 Frank
claimed that his father was in possession of the paintings prior to their alleged
disappearance.68 Frank therefore claimed good title by adverse possession,
even if the paintings had been stolen.69
The Supreme Court of New Jersey began its discussion of the discovery
rule by citing its use in determining accrual for medical malpractice actions.70
From there, the court noted the proliferating use of the discovery rule in other
areas of the law, before concluding that “the discovery rule applies to an
action for replevin of a painting under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.”71 The court
remanded to the trial court to determine if O’Keeffe was “entitled to the
59. Id. at 870.
60. See Jason Barnes, Note, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016:
A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution Claims, 56 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 593, 607 (2018).
61. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
62. Id. at 864.
63. Id. at 864–65.
64. See id. at 865–66.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 866.
67. Id.
68. Id. There was a factual dispute between the parties regarding Frank’s father’s
acquisition of the paintings. Id. O’Keeffe claimed the paintings were stolen, while Frank
claimed that he saw the paintings in his father’s apartment years before O’Keeffe claims the
theft occurred. Id. Nonetheless, “[f]or the purposes of this motion, Snyder conceded that the
paintings had been stolen.” Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 869.
71. Id. at 869–70.
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benefit of the discovery rule.”72 In so holding, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey directed the trial court to consider a number of factors, including:
(1) whether O’Keeffe used due diligence to recover the paintings at the time
of the alleged theft and thereafter; (2) whether at the time of the alleged
theft there was an effective method, other than talking to her colleagues,
for O’Keeffe to alert the art world; and (3) whether registering paintings
with the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. or any other organization
would put a reasonably prudent purchaser of art on constructive notice that
someone other than the possessor was the true owner.73

The trial court did not have the opportunity to apply the discovery rule in the
case because the parties settled prior to retrial.74 Of the three paintings at
issue, O’Keeffe took one, Snyder took one, and the third was sold at a
Sotheby’s auction, with the proceeds used to pay their lawyers.75
E. Modern Adaptations: The Demand and Refusal Rule and the Laches
Defense
The demand and refusal rule, used in New York, states that “a cause of
action for replevin against the good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues
when the true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the person
in possession of the chattel refuses to return it.”76 The rule is premised on
the idea that “[u]ntil the original owner demands the return of her property,
one cannot consider the innocent purchaser’s possession wrongful or
unlawful.”77
In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,78 the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation, on behalf of the Guggenheim Museum, sought the
return of a $200,000 gouache by Marc Chagall.79 Through the use of
accession cards, the Guggenheim alleged that it discovered the gouache was
missing “sometime in the late 1960s, but [the Guggenheim] claims it did not
know that the painting had in fact been stolen until it undertook a complete
inventory of the museum collection beginning in 1969 and ending in 1970.”80

72. Id. at 870.
73. Id.
74. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY: CONCISE EDITION 159 (2d ed. 2017). While
often employed in cases of artwork recovery, the topic of settlement is outside the scope of
this Note.
75. Id.
76. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991). For a
discussion of one of the first uses of the demand and refusal rule, see Henson, supra note 26,
at 1110–12 (citing Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1964)).
77. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1079; see also Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (“Until demand is
made and refused, possession of the stolen property by the good-faith purchaser for value is
not considered wrongful.”).
78. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
79. Id. at 427. Chagall painted the gouache entitled Menageries, or alternatively Le
Marchand de Bestiaux, in 1912. Id. at 428.
80. Id. These facts were disputed by the defendant. Id.
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Upon learning of the theft, the Guggenheim took no steps to publicize the
missing painting.81 The Guggenheim did not notify any art organization nor
did it notify the proper authorities about the theft.82 The Guggenheim
claimed that its decision not to publicize the theft was “tactical.”83 It feared
that such a publicization would force the gouache further into the black
market, making it all the more difficult to locate the painting and effectuate
its return.84
The New York Court of Appeals stated that New York had explicitly
rejected the discovery rule and instead had chosen to continue use of the
demand and refusal rule.85 Notably, the court pointed to Governor Mario
Cuomo’s veto of a New York State Senate bill that would cause the statute
of limitations to run once a museum, in possession of an artwork, had given
notice of its possession.86 In applying the demand and refusal rule, the New
York Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s suggestion that the
Guggenheim’s failure to search with due diligence barred recovery under the
statute of limitations.87 However, the court emphasized that its rejection of
the discovery rule was not intended to “sanction[] the museum’s conduct or
suggest[] that the museum’s conduct [was] no longer an issue in this case.”88
Upon an additional showing of actual prejudice, which is not required to
invoke the statute of limitations, the court noted that the defendant would be
able to assert lack of due diligence as part of a laches defense.89
Thus, unlike the discovery rule, the demand and refusal rule places no
importance on diligent search for a stolen chattel.90 However, diligent search
still factors into an action for replevin in New York through the doctrine of
laches; even under New York’s demand and refusal rule, “a defendant may
still assert a laches defense.”91
Where a defendant asserts a laches defense, the defendant “must show that
the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on its rights so as to make a decree against
the defendant unfair. Laches . . . requires a showing by the defendant that it
has been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in bringing the
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 430.
86. See id. Governor Cuomo’s veto message stated that the implementation of such a rule
“would have caused New York to become ‘a haven for cultural property stolen abroad since
such objects [would] be immune from recovery under the limited time periods established by
the bill.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum #22 Filed with Assembly Bill
Number 11,462-A, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR MARIO M. CUOMO 1986, at 355, 356
(1990)). For discussion of New York’s rejection of a due diligence requirement as part of
demand and refusal, see Henson, supra note 26, at 1125 n.200.
87. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 430 (“[T]here is no reason to obscure [the rule’s] straightforward protection
of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence.”).
91. Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 196 n.12 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing
Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 426).
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action.”92 The two elements of a laches defense—unreasonable delay by the
plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant—prevent claimants from “delay[ing]
bringing their claims indefinitely without consequence.”93 Both demand and
refusal plus laches and the discovery rule are accrual rules worth examining
through the lens of the HEAR Act.
F. The HEAR Act
In 2016, Congress enacted the HEAR Act94 “[t]o provide the victims of
Holocaust-era persecution and their heirs a fair opportunity to recover works
of art confiscated or misappropriated by the Nazis.”95 The HEAR Act
supplants state statutes of limitations for “artwork or other property that was
lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution.”96 Actions that
fall within these parameters “may be commenced not later than 6 years after
the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of—(1) the
identity and location of the artwork or other property; and (2) a possessory
interest of the claimant in the artwork or other property.”97 The HEAR Act
does not “create a civil claim or cause of action under Federal or State law.”98
The accrual of a cause of action under the HEAR Act is based on “actual
discovery,” which the HEAR Act defines as “knowledge” or “having actual
92. Id. at 193 (citing Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 132
(2d Cir. 2003)).
93. Id. at 197 n.12.
94. Since its enactment in 2016, the HEAR Act has been cited fairly limitedly in case law.
See generally Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 186 (discussing a request for return of Pablo Picasso’s
The Actor); Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018), vacated
141 S. Ct. 703 (2021) (discussing request for recovery of Welfenschatz, a medieval relics
collection); Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017)
(discussing the forced sale of a Camille Pissarro impressionist painting); De Csepel v.
Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (discussing request for recovery of a
Nazi-confiscated art collection); Reif v. Nagy, 106 N.Y.S.3d 5 (App. Div. 2019) (discussing
request for return of two works by Egon Schiele); Est. of Kainer v. UBS AG, 34 N.Y.S.3d 58
(App. Div. 2016) (discussing request for return of a Degas painting looted by Nazis from an
art collection); Gowen v. Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc., 77 N.Y.S.3d 605 (Sup. Ct. 2018)
(discussing request for return of Amedeo Modigliani’s Seated Man with a Cane). For a
discussion of the jurisdictional issues involving the HEAR Act recently before the U.S.
Supreme Court, see Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Jewish Property in Nazi
Germany and Hungary, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supremecourt-hears-arguments-on-jewish-property-in-nazi-germany-and-hungary-11607386812
[https://perma.cc/XDC4-TAFH].
95. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong. (as reported
by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29, 2016); see Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note. The HEAR Act was a triumphant piece of bipartisan
legislation, introduced by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX), Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Chuck
Schumer (D-NY). See Max Kutner, Obama Signs New Law to Help Recover Nazi-Looted Art,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/obama-hear-act-law-holocaust534793 [https://perma.cc/276C-FEE5]. The HEAR Act was ultimately passed unanimously.
Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and Uncertainties of the
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 158 (2019).
96. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(a).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 5(f). For a discussion of whether the failure to establish a federal cause of action
renders the HEAR Act unconstitutional, see infra Part II.C.
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knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient information with regard to
a relevant fact or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof.”99
In Zuckerman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,100 the Second Circuit held
that the doctrine of laches is an applicable defense to a claim under the HEAR
Act. In 1912, Paul Friedrich Leffman purchased Pablo Picasso’s The
Actor.101 In an effort to flee Nazi Germany, Leffman sold the painting to
what was called an “‘Aryan’ corporation[], receiving ‘nominal
compensation.’”102 Käte Perls, on behalf of two others, acquired the painting
from Leffman for just $12,000 in 1938.103 The Leffmanns went to
Switzerland in 1938 and eventually to Brazil in 1941.104 In 1947, the
Leffmanns returned to Switzerland, where they remained until their
deaths.105
Laurel Zuckerman, the ancillary administrator of the estate of Leffmann’s
great-grandniece, later filed suit against the Metropolitan Museum of Art
(“the Met”) for the return of the Picasso painting on September 30, 2016, in
the Southern District of New York.106 In response, the Met asserted that
Zuckerman’s claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.107 Zuckerman
contended that the claim was not time-barred under the HEAR Act’s statute
of limitations and that laches is unavailable as a defense in a case under the
HEAR Act.108
The Second Circuit noted the general rule that “in [the] face of a statute of
limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal
relief.”109 Nonetheless, the court held that laches, a traditionally equitable
defense, is applicable to the HEAR Act because the HEAR Act only
explicitly precludes the use of “defense[s] at law relating to the passage of
time.”110 The court further cited a Senate committee report indicating
Congress’s intent to allow laches defenses in cases under the HEAR Act.111
While a prior iteration of the bill precluded the use of “any . . . defense at law

99. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 4.
100. 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019).
101. Id. at 190.
102. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix Volume 1 of 2 (Pages A-1 to A-293) at A-34, Zuckerman,
928 F.3d (No. 18-0634-CV), ECF no. 49-1.
103. Id. at 191. In 2010—just before a woman tripped in the museum and caused a sixinch tear in the painting, depreciating its value—The Actor was valued at $130 million.
Maureen O’Connor, The Price of Falling into a Picasso: $65 Million, GAWKER (Jan. 26,
2010, 4:42 AM), https://gawker.com/5457026/the-price-of-falling-into-a-picasso-65-million
[https://perma.cc/FE2Q-ZWPL].
104. Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 191.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 192.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 195.
109. Id. at 195–96 (alteration in original) (quoting Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
572 U.S. 663, 679 (2014)).
110. Id. at 196 (alteration in original) (quoting Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
of 2016 § 5(a), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note).
111. See id. at 196–97.
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or equity relating to the passage of time (including the doctrine of laches),”112
the HEAR Act as enacted did not include this language in its text.113 The
Senate report discussed by the court stated that the enacted HEAR Act
intentionally “remove[d] the reference precluding the availability of
equitable defenses and the doctrine of laches.”114
Ultimately, the Second Circuit found the Met’s laches defense successful
and barred Zuckerman’s claim under the HEAR Act.115 In addressing each
of the elements of laches, the court found: (1) the Leffmann’s failure to look
for the painting or bring a claim for over seventy years constituted
“unreasonable delay”116 and (2) the extensive time that passed resulted in
“‘deceased witness[es], faded memories, . . . and hearsay testimony of
questionable value,’ as well as the likely disappearance of documentary
evidence.”117 Thus, the Met was prejudiced by Zuckerman’s delay.118
Additionally, the HEAR Act has a retroactivity scheme in place.119 Under
section 5(c), the statute of limitations begins to run as of the date of the HEAR
Act’s enactment where: (1) the claimant already had knowledge before
enactment of the HEAR Act120 but was already barred from asserting a claim
under a preexisting statute of limitations121 or (2) the claimant already had
knowledge before the enactment of the HEAR Act122 and was not already
barred under a preexisting statute of limitations.123 Under section 5(d), the
HEAR Act applies to cases pending in court as of the date of enactment.124
Under section 5(e), the HEAR Act does not apply to cases barred on a date
before enactment if: (1) the claimant had knowledge on or after January 1,

112. Id. at 197 (alteration in original) (quoting Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act,
S. 2763, 114th Cong. § 5(c)(2)(A) (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 7, 2016)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 7 (2016)). “Where
Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to
enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.” Id. (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 193.
117. Id. at 194 (alteration in original) (quoting Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell,
550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App. Div. 1990)).
118. Id. Zuckerman’s appeal to the Supreme Court was denied—a decision critics say
“signal[s] to Holocaust victims and their families that pursuing their property is a fruitless
endeavor.” Sam. P. Israel, The US Supreme Court’s Silence on Nazi Art Theft Fails Holocaust
Survivors, ART NEWSPAPER (Mar. 11, 2020), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/theus-supreme-court-s-silence-on-nazi-art-theft-fails-holocaust-survivors
[https://perma.cc/4CHV-ZPDA].
119. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(c)–(e), 22 U.S.C. § 1621
note. For a discussion of the HEAR Act’s applicability to preexisting claims, see Frankel &
Sharoni, supra note 95, at 169–72.
120. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(c)(1)(A).
121. Id. § 5(c)(1)(B).
122. Id. § 5(c)(2)(A).
123. Id. § 5(c)(2)(B).
124. Id. § 5(d).

2856

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

1999125 and (2) six or more years have passed since the claimant acquired
knowledge.126
Finally, the HEAR Act contains a sunset provision, such that the Act
expires on January 1, 2027.127 The expiration of the HEAR Act and its future
implications are the subject of this Note.
II. WHEN SHOULD THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUE?: DISCOVERY VERSUS
DEMAND AND REFUSAL
Upon expiration of the HEAR Act, the accrual of a cause of action for
recovery of Nazi-confiscated art will revert back to the respective state’s
rule—that is, the discovery rule in the majority of states and the demand and
refusal rule in New York.128 Parts II.A and II.B analyze the pros and cons of
both the discovery rule and the demand and refusal rule to shed light on the
likely choices immediately available to states upon the HEAR Act’s
expiration. Part II.C addresses the constitutionality concerns surrounding the
HEAR Act.
A. Should Discovery Be the Rule?
The discovery rule, in predicating the accrual of the cause of action on
actual or constructive discovery, does well to ensure that original owners, or
their heirs, diligently search for their items.129 Furthermore, the discovery
rule is unlike “[e]arly doctrines,” such as the “adverse possession doctrine”
and “demand and refusal,” which “focused on the actions of subsequent
purchasers or arbitrary events.”130 In that respect, the discovery rule is
logical in that it holds the running of the statute accountable to the actions of
the party bringing the claim for the item’s return.131
Nonetheless, the discovery rule faces criticism. For example, since the
provenances of Nazi-confiscated art are not easily acquired, a rule that is
premised on diligent search is inconducive in cases of Nazi-confiscated
artwork restitution.132 Additionally, under the discovery rule, “the burden
rests with the claimant to demonstrate why the limitation period should be
extended.”133 Thus, where the ultimate goal is returning art to its original
owner, the discovery rule puts an unnecessary (and even impracticable, in the
context of Nazi-confiscated art) onus on the original owner to prove diligent

125. Id. § 5(e)(1).
126. Id. § 5(e)(2).
127. Id. § 5(g).
128. Id.; see supra Parts I.D–E.
129. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980) (citing Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co.,
386 A.2d 1310, 1311 (N.J. 1978)).
130. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1070.
131. See id.
132. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 596.
133. Id. at 608.
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search.134 In other words, the restoration goal of the discovery rule is at odds
with its due diligence requirement.135
Leah Eisen points to a number of other issues raised by the discovery
rule.136 Eisen argues that the inconsistent application by courts of the
discovery rule is detrimental to both the claimant and the current possessor—
presumably for its lack of uniformity, consistency, and predictability.137
According to Eisen, “[t]his lack of clarity and consistency among the various
jurisdictions places owners and possessors of stolen art in precarious
positions.”138 Owners may undertake unnecessary investigation for fear of
being barred if they do not, and possessors who face diligently searching
owners will receive no repose so long as the owner continues searching.139
For Eisen, it is unfair to subject good-faith purchasers to lawsuits where the
good-faith purchaser has been in possession for “ten, twenty, or even one
hundred years” merely because the original owner has continued to diligently
search for the item.140 Moreover, where a purchaser fears a retribution claim
from a diligently searching owner in a discovery jurisdiction, the purchaser
is incentivized to hide the object from the public.141
Eisen also faults the discovery rule for its one-sidedness; since the rule
fails to place a “duty of diligence” on the possessor in the same way it does
the original owner, the discovery rule misses an opportunity to effectuate
retribution from both sides.142 Under Eisen’s proposed reciprocal rule, the
incentive for thieves to engage in the stolen art market would decrease
because both the original owner and the purchaser would be tasked with due
diligence.143
Finally, Eisen “argues that the implementation of the discovery rule creates
an irreconcilable conflict with the previously-established legal notion that a
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See generally Eisen, supra note 40.
137. See id. at 1071 (“[T]he courts have not established objective standards of conduct for
possessors and owners to follow.”).
138. Id. at 1091.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 1089–90.
141. Id. at 1091.
142. Id. at 1094–95. Eisen suggests that “a more efficient method of determining whether
an owner has the right to sue a subsequent purchaser would be to retain the discovery rule’s
investigatory duty on the owner and add a reciprocal investigatory duty on the purchaser.” Id.
at 1096. Now Judge Steven A. Bibas, in his Yale Law Journal student note, furthers this
argument for placing an onus on the purchaser. See generally Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case
Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2463 (1994). Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-312(1)(a) provides for a warranty of good title. U.C.C. § 2312(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2012). Under this section, if an original owner is
able to recover his stolen art from a purchaser, the purchaser is then able to recover his loss
from the merchant that he purchased from by using the warranty of good title. Bibas, supra,
at 2463. By placing the cost on the purchaser, who can ultimately shift that cost to the
merchant, purchasers will be incentivized “to buy from reputable, solvent merchants who
investigate.” Id. For another argument for placing a burden of diligence on the purchaser, see
Henson, supra note 26, at 1150–52.
143. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1097.
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thief does not obtain good title to stolen property.”144 Eisen illustrates that
if a thief can never acquire good title, then a subsequent good-faith purchaser
can never acquire good title because the thief cannot transfer title that he does
not have.145 Thus, “[s]ince a subsequent possessor does not have title to the
stolen art object, an owner automatically has the right to bring an action for
its recovery.”146 Yet, the discovery rule’s bar on a claim where the owner
does not diligently search for the item strips the owner of his right to bring a
claim of superior title that he has, at least under this long-held doctrine,
always had.147 The two options that then stand before courts are to “punish
good faith purchasers for accidentally buying stolen art” or to grant good title
to thieves—neither of which is a particularly desirable choice.148
B. New York’s Push for Demand and Refusal
Proponents of New York’s idiosyncratic demand and refusal rule argue
that the rule “affords the most protection to the true owners of stolen
property.”149
In so arguing, proponents of the rule laude its
“straightforwardness” and ability to “eliminate some judicial discretion.”150
The bright-line aspect of the demand and refusal rule thus results in more
consistent and predictable court decisions.151 This consistency and
predictability is arguably more efficient and less costly for claimants.152 The
demand and refusal rule also deserves consideration simply because it is the
preferred accrual rule of New York—the “mecca of the art world.”153
The demand and refusal rule further prevents the judicial hindsight bias
that impedes fair application of the discovery rule.154 There is concern that
the discovery rule’s “reasonableness standard” can result in judicial

144. Id. at 1071.
145. Id. at 1099.
146. Id. at 1100.
147. Id. at 1099–100. Note, however, that allowing a thief to obtain good title is precisely
what a statute of limitations does in the first place.
148. Id. at 1100.
149. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991); see
also Henson, supra note 26, at 1145 (arguing not for a demand and refusal rule but for a rule
that at least better protects original owners).
150. Barnes, supra note 60, at 609. Raymond Dowd suggests that constructive knowledge
under the discovery rule was a legal fiction created by judges that stripped claimants of their
“traditional common law rights”—ultimately allowing judges, rather than juries, to decide
cases. See Email from Raymond J. Dowd, Partner, Dunnington Bartholow & Miller, LLP, to
author (Oct. 6, 2020, 09:42 EST) [hereinafter Dowd Email] (on file with author); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.”).
151. Barnes, supra note 60, at 609.
152. See id. Uncertainty is especially costly where the steps necessary to satisfy “due
diligence” may counterintuitively drive the stolen work further underground. See Lubell, 569
N.E.2d at 428.
153. Barnes, supra note 60, at 609.
154. See id.
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determinations of lack of due diligence simply because judges have the
benefit of time and information that was not available to original owners.155
Proponents also argue that the demand and refusal rule’s use of a laches
defense is a better way to incorporate a due diligence requirement than
requiring due diligence to rebut a statute of limitations defense; under
demand and refusal, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove lack of
diligence.156 This ultimately allows a claimant to at least have a day in court
without having to carry the initial burden of meeting an uncertain due
diligence standard.
The demand and refusal rule nonetheless faces criticism. The primary
concern with the demand and refusal rule is it is supplemented by laches,
which, it is argued, “adds uncertainty to the bright-line demand and refusal
rule, especially since the level of diligence required ‘depends on the
circumstances of the case.’”157 Further, the burden-shifting framework for
diligence under laches can be viewed as too claimant friendly.158 Successful
laches defenses are infrequent, exacerbating the claimant bias of the rule.159
Raymond Dowd argues that laches (in addition to statutes of limitations
generally) “ought not be available in cases of stolen artworks of European
provenance that entered the United States after 1932 and that were created
prior to 1946.”160 Dowd argues against defenses such as laches, specifically
in cases of Nazi-confiscated art, for two primary reasons: the stolen artwork
should be considered contraband and thus violative of criminal law161 and
Holocaust victims should not be punished for having “been frozen out of
records that might help them track assets for decades.”162

155. See id.
156. Cf. id.
157. Id. at 610 (first quoting DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1987); and
then citing Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429–30).
158. See id.
159. See id.; see also Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an
Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of
Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 52 (1995) (calling laches a “fact intensive inquiry [that]
can rarely be resolved without protracted litigation”). But see Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum
of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019); Raymond J. Dowd, Finding Hope for Restitution of NaziLooted Art?: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, in BUILDING BRIDGES
AMONG ABRAHAM’S CHILDREN: A CELEBRATION OF MICHAEL BERENBAUM (Ed Gaffney ed.,
forthcoming 2021).
160. Raymond J. Dowd, Nazi Looted Art and Cocaine: When Museum Directors Take It,
Call the Cops, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 529, 529 (2013).
161. Id. at 529–30 (“If a museum director asserted statutes of limitations or laches when
caught with a kilo of cocaine, such defenses would not pass the laugh test.”).
162. Id. at 530; see also Herbert I. Lazerow, Holocaust Art Disputes: The Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 INT’L LAW. no. 2, 2018, at 195, 258 (“HEAR is
also likely to make litigation more expensive by shifting from the simple question of whether
the statute of limitations has expired to the question of whether the claimant is barred by the
doctrine of laches, with its requirement of discovery and a separate trial on that issue.”);
Rachel Sklar, Holocaust-Era Restitution Claims: Is the HEAR Act a Game Changer?, 12
REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 159, 194 (2017) (proposing the HEAR Act be amended to
preclude laches defenses).
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An oft-overlooked issue with the demand and refusal rule is its treatment
of thieves.163 The demand and refusal rule applies only to good-faith
purchasers164 and “is premised on the theory that the defendant’s possession
is not wrongful until he or she refuses to return the property to the
claimant.”165 As Eisen states: “if the possessor is a wrongful taker or a
purchaser with knowledge, courts should not require a demand, because the
possessor already has notice of his wrongful retention of the original owner’s
property.”166 It is further suggested by Judith Wallace that the rule does not
apply to thieves because “demand would be futile . . . if the possessor is a
thief who would know his possession is wrongful,” he would “presumably
refuse any demand.”167 This wrinkle leads to the result that a thief or badfaith purchaser may be advantaged over a good-faith purchaser.168
A hypothetical can illustrate this result. If a thief (T) steals a work of art
from an owner (O) in a demand and refusal jurisdiction with a three-year
statute of limitations, the statute begins to run when the theft occurs because
the demand and refusal rule applies only to good-faith purchasers, not
thieves. Thus, if T holds on to the art for the requisite three-year period, or
sells it to a bad-faith purchaser who is aware that the art has been stolen, and
holds on to the art for three years, T or the bad-faith purchaser will acquire
title upon the running of the statute. However, if T sells the art to a goodfaith purchaser who is unaware that the art had been stolen, O’s cause of
action against the good-faith purchaser would not begin to run until there was
a demand by O and a refusal by the good-faith purchaser. Thus, T or the badfaith purchaser could acquire title within three years of the theft, while the
good-faith purchaser could not acquire title until three years after a demand
and refusal. Note, however, that once O has made a demand, the good-faith
purchaser will either acquiesce and return the art or refuse its return, and O
will immediately file suit. Thus, there is no practical situation where the
statute can run and transfer title to the good-faith purchaser. Therefore, T
and the bad-faith purchaser will be treated better than a good-faith purchaser.

163. See generally Eisen, supra note 40, at 1080–81.
164. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
165. Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 95, at 172; see also Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (“Until
demand is made and refused, possession of the stolen property by the good-faith purchaser for
value is not considered wrongful.”); Eisen, supra note 40, at 1079.
166. Eisen, supra note 40, at 1080. Contra infra Part III.C.
167. Judith Wallace, New York’s Distinctive Rule Regarding Recovery of Misappropriated
Art After the Court of Appeals’ Decision in Mirvish v. Mott, SPENCER’S ART L.J. (June 2012),
http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/spencer/spencers-art-law-journal-7-18-12.asp
[https://perma.cc/38XQ-QEXN].
168. See Eisen, supra note 40, at 1080–81. For a discussion of thieves being treated better
than good-faith purchasers, see Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (“In DeWeerth v. Baldinger, which
the trial court in this case relied upon in granting Mrs. Lubell’s summary judgment motion,
the Second Circuit took note of the fact that New York case law treats thieves and good-faith
purchasers differently and looked to that difference as a basis for imposing a reasonable
diligence requirement on the owners of stolen art.” (citing DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987))). Note, however, that the New York Court of Appeals rejected the Second
Circuit’s imposition of a due diligence requirement. Id. at 430.
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C. Is the HEAR Act Even Constitutional?
William L. Charron has suggested that the HEAR Act may be
unconstitutional.169 Charron argues that the HEAR Act, by supplanting
states’ statutes of limitations without creating a federal cause of action or
rooting itself in any provision of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
should be seen as an exclusively procedural statute.170 According to
Charron, the HEAR Act’s failure to create a federal cause of action is
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment’s principles of federalism, and
“procedural rules governing state law claims should be deemed reserved to
the states under the Tenth Amendment.”171
Charron’s unconstitutionality argument results in a difficult tension
between state and federal powers with respect to statutes of limitations for
Nazi-confiscated art. Recall that the court in Von Saher I held that the state
of California was unable to carve out an exception from its statute of
limitations specifically for Nazi-confiscated art.172 In response to this
decision, Congress passed legislation to protect Nazi-confiscated art in a way
that states, under Von Saher I, could not.173 While the HEAR Act attempts
to root its validity in Von Saher I and Congress’s foreign affairs power,174
Charron notes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Von Saher v. Norton Simon
Museum175 (Von Saher II): “the court in Von Saher II held that a claim for
restitution asserted against a private party (not against a foreign government),
under ‘a state statute of general applicability’ (such as for replevin) rather
than under ‘Holocaust-specific legislation,’ raises no foreign policy conflicts
sufficient to trigger foreign affairs preemption.”176 Thus, Charron’s
argument raises an interesting issue: who, Congress or the states, is able to
address Nazi-confiscated art in this way?177
Emily J. Cunningham raises another constitutionality argument against the
HEAR Act by asserting that the HEAR Act’s retroactivity may render the
Act unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.178 Cunningham cites
169. See generally William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
Presented by the Federal HEAR Act, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 19.
170. Id. at 61.
171. Id. at 60–61; see U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”). But see Jennifer A. Kreder & Virginia L. Schell, The
Constitutionality of the HEAR Act: Empowering American Courts to Return Holocaust-Era
Artwork and Honor History, 30 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 68 (2020) (“The
HEAR Act is constitutional and does not violate the principles of federalism.”).
172. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
174. See Charron, supra note 169, at 36; see also Dowd Email, supra note 150. For a
discussion of how Congress may have the power to regulate the art market through the
Commerce Clause, see Henson, supra note 26, at 1154.
175. 754 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2014).
176. Charron, supra note 169, at 36 n.83 (quoting Von Saher II, 754 F.3d at 719, 723).
177. Part III assumes the validity of Charron’s argument and the validity of Von Saher I.
See infra Part III.A.5.
178. See Emily J. Cunningham, Note, Justice on the Merits: An Analysis of the Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 69 CASE. W. RSRV. L. REV. 427, 452 (2018); see also
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Campbell v. Holt179 as evidence of her proposition. In Campbell, the Court
indicated, albeit in dicta, that in a case of recovery of personal property, “[i]t
may . . . very well be held that . . . where the question is as to the removal of
the bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative act passed after the bar
has become perfect, such act deprives the party of his property without due
process of law.”180 Cunningham then rebuts her own claim by stating that
since the HEAR Act provides for subsequent trial or arbitration, such taking
of property would not violate procedural due process rights because cases
would be heard before a court or tribunal before any property was taken.181
Nonetheless, Cunningham raises interesting questions of the constitutionality
of retroactivity under the Fifth Amendment, and Part III addresses these
concerns.182
III. THE HEAR ACT PROMOTES DEMAND AND REFUSAL AND HOW STATES
SHOULD IMPLEMENT IT
Upon the expiration of the HEAR Act, states must address important
questions regarding the trajectory of statute of limitations rules for Naziconfiscated art. This part argues that: (1) the HEAR Act invites state
legislation implementing the demand and refusal rule; (2) the rule should be
applied to all stolen chattels upon expiration of the HEAR Act; (3) the rule
should extend to thieves and bad-faith purchasers, not just good-faith
purchasers; (4) the rule should not be applied retroactively; and (5) states
should shorten the duration of statutes of limitations upon implementing
demand and refusal.
A. The HEAR Act Invites State Legislation Implementing the Demand and
Refusal Rule
When the HEAR Act expires, discovery-rule states should adopt the
demand and refusal rule. The HEAR Act, while predicated on “actual
discovery,” adopts a rule that is actually more similar to the demand and
refusal rule than to the discovery rule.183 The HEAR Act, by addressing the
immorality of Nazi-confiscation of artwork and the unfairness of statutory
bars to recovery, should be a model for states of the need for more claimantfriendly rules affecting stolen personal property. Therefore, this section
Lazerow, supra note 162, at 258 (noting that “any attempt to apply HEAR to lengthen the
statute of limitations for those properties” where good title was acquired by adverse possession
“would be an unconstitutional taking of the property barred by the Fifth Amendment”). The
Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
179. 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
180. Cunningham, supra note 178, at 453–54 (quoting Campbell, 115 U.S. at 623).
181. See id. at 455.
182. See id. at 453–55; infra Part III.D; see also Dowd Email, supra note 150 (“The
constitutional problem for any proposal is passing a law that appears to be a taking of
property.”).
183. Contra Alexander Hull, Note, Shoring up the HEAR Act: Proposed Amendments to
Federal Legislation Designed to Assist Heirs and Claimants of Nazi-Looted Art, 28 J.L. &
POL’Y 238, 267–71 (2019) (calling the HEAR Act a discovery rule).
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argues that states that currently follow the discovery rule should learn from
the HEAR Act and recognize the need for an independent, yet uniform,
switch to the demand and refusal rule.
1. The Goals of the HEAR Act Are Most in Line with the Demand and
Refusal Rule
The “Findings” and “Purposes” sections of the HEAR Act indicate that the
Act is designed to ensure that meritorious claims are not unjustly barred by
restrictive statutes of limitations.184 Thus, as the purpose of the HEAR Act
is claimant friendliness,185 a shift away from discovery (i.e., actual or
constructive discovery) and toward demand and refusal is ultimately
necessary. Since the demand and refusal rule provides the longest time for
claimants to recover their items, and since laches shifts the burden of proof
for diligence onto the defendant,186 the demand and refusal rule’s claimant
friendliness is most in line with the stated goals and purposes of the HEAR
Act. Thus, upon expiration of the Act, states should adopt the demand and
refusal rule.
2. “Actual Discovery” Is More Like Demand and Refusal than Discovery
While the HEAR Act has been described as adopting a discovery rule,187
this Note argues that “actual discovery,” as used in the HEAR Act, is more
analogous to demand and refusal than it is to discovery. The description of
the HEAR Act as creating a discovery rule has some credibility given that
the HEAR Act is predicated on “actual discovery.”188 However, in practice,
actual discovery is more similar in its use and application to demand and
refusal than to discovery. Thus, states should see the HEAR Act’s rule as an
invitation to shift to a demand and refusal rule.
In a case brought under the HEAR Act, once a potential claimant has actual
knowledge, his lack of due diligence in instituting a suit may still jeopardize
his claim under laches.189 Similarly, under the demand and refusal rule, if a
claimant, after actual discovery, does not send a demand in a reasonable time
so as to avoid prejudice to the defendant, the claim will be barred by
laches.190 In both instances, once the claimant knows where the item is, the
claimant must either demand the item’s return from the possessor or bring a
suit. Additionally, once the claimant has made a demand and received a
refusal, there is no reason not to immediately bring a suit for return of the
184. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 §§ 2–3, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note.
185. Dowd has suggested that the law of decedents, “an area that is [also] governed by state
law,” is similarly claimant friendly. Thus, there is evidence that state law is, and should be,
generally claimant friendly. Dowd Email, supra note 150.
186. See supra Parts I.E, II.B.
187. See Hull, supra note 183, at 267–71.
188. See id.
189. See generally Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019);
supra notes 100–18 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part I.E.
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item. In that sense, initiating suit upon demand and refusal and bringing suit
upon actual discovery become nearly synonymous in practice. In either case,
to avoid being barred under laches, the claimant must act by either
demanding the return of the property or filing suit upon actual knowledge.
The facts of O’Keeffe (although the court employed the discovery rule)
illustrate that actual discovery is, in practice, temporally similar to demand
and refusal.191 O’Keeffe actually discovered the location of her paintings in
September 1975, demanded their return—which was refused by Snyder—
and ultimately filed her complaint in March 1976.192 In the span of a mere
six months, actual discovery and demand and refusal were made.193
Dissimilarly, in a discovery-rule jurisdiction, “constructive discovery,” or
the time when one should have known the whereabouts of one’s item, may
be very far off from actual discovery, a demand, and the commencement of
a lawsuit. Since constructive discovery is merely a hypothetical fiction,194
the time difference between constructive discovery and a demand/suit may
be substantial. For example, perhaps O’Keeffe, had she been diligently
searching for her paintings, should have known the whereabouts of her
paintings long before she actually discovered them.195 Thus, the HEAR
Act’s “actual discovery” requirement is more temporally similar to demand
and refusal than it is to constructive discovery under the discovery rule.
Therefore, in learning from the HEAR Act, states should seek to adopt a
demand and refusal rule upon the HEAR Act’s expiration.
3. Applicability of Laches in Zuckerman Promotes Demand and Refusal
Plus Laches
The Second Circuit’s application of the doctrine of laches to actions
brought under the HEAR Act is evidence that courts,196 in addition to
Congress, recognize that the HEAR Act’s rule is more analogous to the
demand and refusal rule. The Second Circuit extensively discussed the
legislative history of the HEAR Act to determine that equitable defenses such
as laches were meant to be applicable under the HEAR Act.197 Once again,
states should thus learn from the HEAR Act that the best way to incorporate
due diligence in art restitution cases is through a laches defense, rather than
through a discovery rule.
Critics of this idea would likely claim that the demand and refusal plus
laches rule should not be adopted because laches defenses are often

191. See generally O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
192. Id. at 864–66.
193. See id.
194. See Dowd Email, supra note 150.
195. See generally O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 862.
196. See generally Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019).
197. See id. at 196–97; supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text. Note that laches could
technically still apply to a case in a discovery rule jurisdiction. However, this Note argues
that the due diligence importance that laches holds in demand and refusal rule jurisdictions
closely ties laches and the demand and refusal rule.
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unsuccessful.198 However, Zuckerman illustrates plainly that courts will find
laches defenses successful under the HEAR Act where appropriate.199 Thus,
the fear of widespread, unsuccessful laches claims, even where warranted, is
not a concern under the HEAR Act and should not dissuade states from
adopting demand and refusal rules.
4. The HEAR Act Intentionally Keeps the Demand and Refusal Rule in
Place
The sunset provision in the HEAR Act ensures the continuation of the
demand and refusal rule.200 Upon expiration of the HEAR Act, “a claimant,
who for whatever reason could not or did not want to bring a claim under the
HEAR Act, may still be able to bring a claim under New York’s demand and
refusal rule.”201 Put differently, “the sunset provision preserves New York’s
demand and refusal rule, but delays its potential invocation until January 1,
2027.”202
However, those that note the preservation of the demand and refusal rule
ignore the potential intentionality behind leaving the rule in place. Jason
Barnes, for example, simply notes the existence of this caveat—calling it “a
one-way ratchet in favor of claimants.”203 Though Barnes cites the Senate
subcommittee testimony of Agnes Peresztegi, president of the Commission
for Art Recovery—noting that the HEAR Act should not supplant “statute of
limitation rules more favorable to claimants”—he fails to tackle head-on the
idea that, in allowing this caveat to exist, Congress had, in essence, endorsed
the demand and refusal rule.204
Simon Frankel and Sari Sharoni concur that the HEAR Act preserves New
York’s demand and refusal rule.205 They state that, “[p]erhaps, for claims
arising on or after the Act’s enactment, a New York claimant potentially has
two bites at the apple.”206 However, where Barnes fails to address the
intentionality behind this preservation of the demand and refusal rule,
Frankel and Sharoni rightfully highlight it:
This appears consistent with the Act’s legislative history, which states,
“[n]othing, however, bars the claimant from asserting claims that remain
timely under applicable State law.” And, arguably, an implicit purpose of

198. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
199. See generally Zuckerman, 928 F.3d 186.
200. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 632–33.
201. Id. at 633.
202. Hull, supra note 183, at 270; see also Lazerow, supra note 162, at 257 (stating that
the HEAR Act “will have little effect in New York, the most popular state for litigating
Holocaust recovery cases”).
203. Barnes, supra note 60, at 633.
204. See id. at 612 (quoting HEAR Act Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Agnes
Peresztegi, President, Commission for Art Recovery)). Note that laches would still apply to a
claimant who tries to file a claim under New York’s demand and refusal rule after the HEAR
Act expires.
205. See Frankel & Sharoni, supra note 95, at 173.
206. Id.
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the Act is to extend existing state limitations periods, rather than constrain
them in some way. . . .
[Thus], the language used by Congress seems significant and should be
given effect.207

Finally, Frankel and Sharoni note Congress’s use of “may” rather than
“shall,” for the purposes of commencing an action under the HEAR Act, as
evidence that Congress wanted to preserve state statutes already more
favorable to claimants.208
Despite the likely intentionality by Congress, the preservation of the
demand and refusal rule has been called “a nonsensical result that rewards or
at least allows claimants to wait before bringing claims.”209 “This runs
contrary to the sensible policy rationale at the heart of laches, which is to
avoid prejudice and unreasonable delay in bringing claims.”210 However,
this argument against the preservation of the demand and refusal rule fails
because it muddles the policy implications of laches and the application of
laches. Where the demand and refusal rule remains, laches still applies; the
preservation of the demand and refusal rule cannot run counter to the policy
rationale of laches because the demand and refusal rule employs laches as a
possible defense.211 Furthermore, the preservation of the demand and refusal
rule in no way “rewards” a claimant who delays bringing a claim because a
laches defense still imposes a due diligence requirement.212 Any claim that
is brought under New York’s demand and refusal rule after January 1, 2027,
would still be barred by laches if unreasonably delayed to the prejudice of
the defendant.213 Thus, it is likely that Congress intentionally left the
demand and refusal rule in place—relying on laches to bar unreasonably
delayed claims.
5. State Implementation to Avoid Unconstitutionality Concerns
While it has been suggested that Congress could alternatively “replac[e]
the discovery rule with New York’s demand and refusal rule, thereby making
it so that this claimant-friendly rule preempts each state’s statute of
limitations in the Nazi-looted art context, without a sunset provision,”214
such a solution is flawed. Instead, states, rather than Congress, should
implement demand and refusal rules on their own—thereby promoting
ultimate art restitution and preserving due diligence through laches, all the
while allowing statutes of limitations to remain a power of the states.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 114-394, at 10 (2016)).
Id. at 173–74.
Hull, supra note 183, at 270.
Id.
See supra Part I.E.
See supra Part I.E.
See supra Part I.E.
Hull, supra note 183, at 271.
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Importantly, this suggestion of state implementation avoids Charron’s
unconstitutionality argument.215
Prior iterations of the HEAR Act and its revisions, as well as the final
version of the HEAR Act, indicate that Congress is apprehensive about
remaining in this area of the law for too long; an earlier version of the bill
stated that “the enactment of a Federal law is the best way to ensure that
claims to Nazi-confiscated art are adjudicated,” while the final version of the
Act stated that “the enactment of a Federal law is necessary to ensure that
claims to Nazi-confiscated art are adjudicated.”216 This change in language
may indicate Congress’s intent to remove itself from this area once the issue
has been addressed—remaining only as long as is needed to bring the issue
to the states’ attention.
Furthermore, the better argument regarding Congress’s intention not to
involve itself perpetually in this area lies in the text of the HEAR Act itself.
The inclusion of the sunset provision217 demonstrates clear congressional
intent to not eternally involve itself in this area of the law. While Barnes, for
example, argues that Congress cites Von Saher I in the HEAR Act “as if to
blame the HEAR Act, and its erosion of state sovereignty, on the Judiciary,”
the HEAR Act does not “ero[de] . . . state sovereignty” simply because it
contains a sunset provision.218 If Congress truly intended to overtake the
power of states to determine statute of limitations rules on Nazi-confiscated
art, it could have ensured that the Act endured.219
A number of other federal responses to the HEAR Act have been
suggested.220 For example, “Congress could have passed legislation that
would have allowed or encouraged states to establish alternative procedures
for restitution claims for art lost during the Nazi era.”221 However, this
alternative would merely duplicate the work the HEAR Act is already doing.
The HEAR Act, and its inclusion of a sunset provision, encourages states to
recognize that the discovery rule is not the most effective way to protect
stolen art and thus further encourages states to adopt the demand and refusal
rule. Congress then included the sunset provision so that, at the end of this

215. See supra Part II.C. Alexander Hull’s student note, in contrast to this Note, suggests
that upon expiration of the HEAR Act, Congress could pass a federal cause of action that
would supplant state statute of limitations rules with a federal demand and refusal rule. See
Hull, supra note 183, at 274. Although creating a federal cause of action would appease
Charron’s unconstitutionality argument, it seems that the better solution is to allow states to
adopt these rules independently. See supra Part II.C. Since statutes of limitations for stolen
chattels have historically been a state law arena, this Note argues federal legislation is too
strong a response. See Dowd Email, supra note 150.
216. Compare Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, S. 2763, 114th Cong.
§ 2(7) (as reported in Senate, Sept. 29, 2016) (emphasis added), with Holocaust Expropriated
Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2(7), 130 Stat. 1524, 1525 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 1621 note) (emphasis added).
217. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(g), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note.
218. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 624.
219. See Hull, supra note 183, at 271.
220. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 624–25.
221. Id. at 624.
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“test period,” states could, on their own, implement rules closer to the
demand and refusal rule.222
Therefore, it appears that Congress specifically included the sunset
provision in the HEAR Act to indicate its apprehension about involving itself
too heavily in an otherwise state-law-dominated area.223 The sunset
provision has the precise purpose of ending federal power in this area and
returning the power to the states.224
B. Application to All Stolen Chattels to Avoid Von Saher I
States that adopt a demand and refusal rule should further apply that rule
to all stolen chattels, not just Nazi-confiscated art.225 This expansion of the
rule would avoid the holding in Von Saher I226 and expand claimantfriendliness to cases of any stolen personal property.227
The demand and refusal rule adopted by states can be applied to all stolen
chattels to avoid the holding in Von Saher I that states cannot create
exceptions to their statutes of limitations for Nazi-confiscated art because
doing so infringes on Congress’s foreign affairs power.228 By applying the
rule to all chattels, no such exception would exist.
While some have suggested that the holding in Von Saher I was wrongly
decided,229 mere application to all chattels, not just Nazi-confiscated art,
would avoid that conflict. Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress disagreed
with the holding in Von Saher I230 because Congress positively cited the case
in the HEAR Act.231 More likely, Congress’s citation to Von Saher I was an
underwrite of, or congressional concurrence with, its holding. This Note’s
suggestion to broaden the rule to all stolen chattels would avoid the issues
that arise under Von Saher I and the suggestions of those who find its holding
erroneous.232
Lastly, the application of the rule to all stolen chattels, not just Naziconfiscated art, would ensure that claimant friendliness is provided in any
case of a stolen item; such a rule would mean that no more importance is
222. See id.
223. See id. at 622–23.
224. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 5(g), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note
(“Any civil claim or cause of action commenced on or after [January 1, 2027,] to recover
artwork or other property described in this Act shall be subject to any applicable Federal or
State statutes of limitations . . . .”).
225. Contra Bibas, supra note 142, at 2468 (“It would be a mistake to lump all chattels
together without further thought, just as it was a mistake to lump real and personal property
together for purposes of adverse possession doctrine.”).
226. See generally Von Saher I, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
227. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
228. See generally Von Saher I, 592 F.3d. 954.
229. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 60, at 623; Dowd Email, supra note 150.
230. Contra sources cited supra note 229.
231. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 § 2(7), 22 U.S.C. § 1621 note.
232. See Barnes, supra note 60, at 624 (suggesting that Congress could have passed
legislation allowing states to “tinker with their own accrual and tolling rules for restitution
claims for art lost during the Nazi era,” even though such a suggestion is precisely what Von
Saher I rejected).
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placed on a stolen Picasso than on the stuffed bear your grandmother gave
you as a child.233 While it can be suggested that the rule should apply only
to “unique chattels,”234 states should not draw lines of demarcation based on
personal value and sentimentality.
C. Application of Demand and Refusal to Thieves and Bad-Faith
Purchasers
One of the most startling concerns about the demand and refusal rule is
that it appears to treat thieves and bad-faith purchasers better than it treats
good-faith purchasers.235 In Lubell, the court applied demand and refusal to
the oft-encountered case of a demand for return of an object held by a goodfaith purchaser—nonetheless noting the “seemingly anomalous” result that
by applying demand and refusal only to good-faith purchasers, “a different
rule applies when the stolen object is in the possession of the thief. In that
situation, the Statute of Limitations runs from the time of the theft.”236 This
notion defies logic and basic senses of morality; thus, upon implementing a
demand and refusal rule, states should apply it beyond just good-faith
purchasers, to provide ultimate claimant friendliness irrespective of who is
in possession of the item.237 The application of demand and refusal to thieves
and bad-faith purchasers, in addition to good-faith purchasers, would
effectuate ultimate claimant friendliness in all situations of stolen goods. Not
only would the type of chattel not impede an original owner’s right to recover
the item, but the type of possessor would also not change the original owner’s
rights as against the possessor.
D. Nonretroactivity of Newly Implemented Demand and Refusal Rules to
Avoid Fifth Amendment Concerns
Upon implementing the demand and refusal rule for all chattels and
applying it to all possessors, states should classify the statute as purely
prospective238—that is, the statute should not apply to a possessor who has
233. See Email from James Kainen, Professor, Fordham Univ. Sch. of L., to author (Oct.
6, 2020, 11:57 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kainen Email].
234. Dowd suggests that there are public policy reasons, including the “buyer beware rule,”
that might indicate that “commercial,” “fungible,” and “commodity-type goods” should be
treated differently than something “unique.” Dowd Email, supra note 150. As Professor
Kainen queries in response: “So I should get my Dad’s watch back, but not my car?” Kainen
Email, supra note 233.
235. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
236. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
237. See Bibas, supra note 142, at 2467 (“Letting owners recover is consistent with the
law’s deeply rooted protection of property rights and its refusal to treat a theft as a legal
transfer of title.”); see also Nicholas Joy, Note, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection
Foundation: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act Was Unveiled but Congress Still
Has Work to Do, 49 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 3, 22 (2019) (“If Congress wants to ensure that
Cassirer and other Holocaust-era art restitution cases are resolved fairly and justly, then claims
of adverse possession for personal property should be prohibited.”).
238. While other issues of retroactivity can be imagined, this Note’s suggestion is to allow
retroactivity only to the extent constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
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already acquired title under a preexisting statute but would not yet hold title
under the new statute. Put otherwise, the new statute should not revive
actions that were previously barred by the old statute.
A hypothetical can illustrate where this might occur. Suppose a thief (T)
steals a painting from an owner (O) in a demand and refusal jurisdiction. The
applicable statute of limitations is three years. T holds on to the painting for
three years. After three years, the jurisdiction adopts this Note’s proposed
statute—including the provision that demand and refusal applies to thieves
and bad-faith purchasers. Under this new rule, O demands the painting’s
return from T, and T refuses. O subsequently brings a suit for the painting,
claiming that the statute began to run when O demanded the painting and T
refused. T argues that the statute began to run at the time of the theft and so
he has already acquired good title. Since the statute has run, the new statute
should not apply to divest T’s title.
To avoid any Fifth Amendment concerns of unconstitutional takings of
property,239 this Note suggests that where any statute of limitations for
replevin has run on an item in the hands of a subsequent possessor, and thus
the subsequent possessor has acquired good title, newly implemented
demand and refusal rules should not resurrect the original owner’s previously
barred cause of action.
E. Shortening the Statute of Limitations Duration
New York’s statute of limitations duration for a cause of action for
replevin is three years.240 New Jersey’s statute is six years.241 In reality,
where a demand and refusal rule is used, there is no need to have such lengthy
statutes of limitations. Upon formal demand and refusal, both parties are on
notice of the potential for a lawsuit, and the suit can and should be brought
immediately upon formal refusal.242 Shortening the duration of the statute
of limitations following formal refusal would serve the purpose of preventing
stale claims, lost evidence, and faded memories,243 without compromising
the demand and refusal rule’s goal of claimant friendliness.
A number of cases illustrate that a long duration between demand and
refusal and filing suit is practically unnecessary and that such a lengthy
duration only serves to allow for the type of unreasonable delay that laches
seeks to avoid.244 For example, in Lubell, demand for the artwork’s return
was made on January 9, 1986, and the action was commenced on September
28, 1987.245 In O’Keeffe, although the discovery rule was employed,
O’Keeffe made a demand for the painting after discovering its location in

239. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
240. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (MCKINNEY 2020).
241. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 2021).
242. Despite the use of the word “immediately,” this Note recognizes the time needed to
hire a lawyer and draft a complaint.
243. See supra note 39.
244. See supra text accompanying note 92.
245. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. 1991).
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September 1975 and its possessor in February 1976; she subsequently filed
suit in March of 1976.246 In Reif v. Nagy,247 plaintiff was put on notice by
the defendant’s attorney via email on November 13, 2015, and the complaint
was filed in March 2016.248 Therefore, there is no practical reason to have a
lengthy statute of limitations in a demand and refusal jurisdiction when suits
can and should be filed almost immediately following receipt of refusal.
Furthermore, since statutes of limitations were established before these
accrual rules were set in place,249 the legislature is free to adjust these
durations once accrual rules are defined. Thus, legislatures, upon adopting
this Note’s proposed demand and refusal rule, should additionally shorten the
duration of statutes to promote expediency—and doing so would not really
change the practices of claimants.
Finally, lengthy statutes of limitations are only necessary where the
running of the statute of limitations is predicated on constructive discovery
rather than demand and refusal—such an expansive duration allows “wiggle
room” for the uncertainty of constructive discovery250 but would not be
needed where a bright-line demand and refusal rule is used. Where a state is
apprehensive about implementing the demand and refusal rule for fear it will
not result in expeditious filing of claims, both the doctrine of laches and a
shortened statute of limitations can be employed.
CONCLUSION
Of the 600,000 works of art taken by Nazis under Hitler’s regime, only
100,000 works have been recovered.251 Due to the difficulties that arise in
tracking these works down, Congress passed the HEAR Act to effectuate the
long overdue recovery of stolen Jewish property.252 However, the HEAR
Act’s claimant friendliness should serve as a lesson to states of the need for
rules that effectuate recovery of all stolen property. Nazi-confiscated
artwork is a striking and necessary example of the need for a nationwide shift
toward more claimant-friendly rules for recovery of all stolen personal
246. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 864, 866 (N.J. 1980).
247. 106 N.Y.S.3d 5 (App. Div. 2019). For a more thorough elaboration on Reif and
Dowd’s involvement in the case, see Dowd, supra note 159; see also William D. Cohan, Court
Says Heirs of Holocaust Victim Can Keep Nazi-Looted Works, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/arts/design/nazi-looted-art-holocaust.html
[https://perma.cc/TG4L-SF5C]; William D. Cohan, A Suit Over Schiele Drawings Invokes
New
Law
on
Nazi-Looted
Art,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/arts/design/a-suit-over-schiele-drawings-invokes-newlaw-on-nazi-looted-art.html [https://perma.cc/3LRS-7WYR]; Nicholas O’Donnell, Heirs of
Holocaust Victim Fritz Grünbaum Win Restitution of Nazi-Looted Schiele Drawings, ART L.
REP. (July 11, 2019, 5:05 PM), https://blog.sullivanlaw.com/artlawreport/grünbaum-heirswin-restitution-of-nazi-looted-schiele-drawings [https://perma.cc/TAP5-ZYE4].
248. See generally Reif, 175 A.D.3d 107.
249. The judicial imposition of the discovery rule and demand and refusal rule were part
of a judicial interpretation of the pre-existing statutes of limitations. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text; see also Dowd Email, supra note 150.
250. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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property. Thus, upon the expiration of the HEAR Act, states should evaluate
their statutes of limitations for replevin and adopt the claimant-friendly
demand and refusal rule. In adopting this rule, states should implement the
following principles. States should apply this rule to all stolen chattels, not
just Nazi-confiscated artwork, and should apply this rule to thieves and badfaith purchasers, not just good-faith purchasers. Such an application would
allow for ultimate claimant friendliness and the recovery of more stolen
chattels. Further, application of the doctrine of laches could weed out any
nonmeritorious claims. To avoid any unconstitutional takings where title has
already vested under a previous statute, this rule should not be applied
retroactively. Finally, the duration of the statute of limitations should be
shortened to ensure expeditious filing of claims.

